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THE COMMON LAW OF FEDERAL TAXATION
GEORGE W. ERIKSEN*

"The very considerations which judges most rarely mention,
and always with an apology, are the secret root from which the
law draws all the juices of life. I mean, of course, considerations of what is expedient for the community concerned."**
It is axiomatic that there is no federal general common law." The
axiom is misleading, however, unless the emphasis is placed on the
word "general"; for in every field of law into which the Federal
Government has entered to perform a national function a body of
rules and principles, a sort of judicial fungus, has attached itself to
the main trunk of the congressional enactment. 2 It probably does
not matter whether we call this body of rules and principles a "common law" or by some other name. Judicial dealing with statutes
results in a substantial amount of judge-made law, some as an incident of interpretation or definition and some that might be more
properly classified as judicial legislation. In federal tax law the
judicial embellishment bears a strong resemblance to the common
law, not only as we understand it today but as Lord Coke and his
contemporaries summed up and restated it out of the judicial decisions of the English courts of the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries.

Judicial statements of the strict accountability of the citizen to
his government in tax matters are commonplace. The homily of Mr.
Justice Holmes that "men must turn square corners when they
deal with the Government" 3 has been echoed in the more recent

pronouncement of Judge Learned Hand that "he who deals with
the government must dot his i's and cross his t's; and if he assumes
*A.B., M.B.A., LL.B. 1937, University of Michigan; Member of Michigan and
Tampa, Florida, Bars.
**HLMEs, THE COMMON' LAW 35 (1881).
'Erie R.R. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2

See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Pub. Co., 181 U.S. 92 (1901). To the extent
that a federal common law is necessary to the construction of federal statutes, it is
sometimes assumed to exist, McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934).
$Rock Island, A. & L. R.R. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920). He continues: "If it attaches even purely formal conditions to its consent to be sued those
conditions must be complied with. Lex non praecipit inutilia (Co. Litt. 127b)

expresses rather an ideal than an accomplished fact."
[1781
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that he may rely upon the ordinary rules which apply as between
individuals, he is doomed to disappointment."
Compare, for a moment, the characteristics of the strict lawwhich was the Germanic substratum of our legal system representing
the common law of the time of Lord Coke. These are some of Dean
Pound's characterizations:5
".. . the strict law insists upon full and exact performance
at all events of a duty undertaken in legal form. It makes no
allowance for accidents and has no mercy for defaulters....
". the strict law had little use for one who was tricked or
coerced into a legal transaction .... If he could not guard his
own interests, he must not ask the courts, which were only
keeping the peace, to do so for him .... [I]t held that every
man of mature age must take care of himself. He need -not
expect to be saved from himself by legal paternalism or by legal
maternalism.... When he acted, he was held to have acted at
his own risk with his eyes open, and he must abide the appointed consequences. . . .The stock argument of the strict
law for the many harsh rules it enforces is that the situation was
produced by the party's own folly and he must abide it. The
whole point of view is that of primitive society ...."
The purpose of this analysis is neither historical nor theoretical.
A very practical problem is presented. We must litigate tax cases,
and we must advise tax clients. We cannot do so unless, to some degree, we can prognosticate the bases on which courts will decide
tax cases. As Professor Rice states it "6
"There is no problem today more fundamental in federal
tax law than the rationale (or lack of it) that underlies the
conduct of the courts in striking down tax avoidance devices and
refusing to recognize business arrangements which meet statutory requirements for tax saving but exude an odor piscatorial."
How can you advise your client? The current attitude on the
4Angelus Milling Co. v. Nunan, 144 F.2d 469, 472 (2d Cir. 1944).
5THE Sprnr oF THE Co mzoN LAW 18, 19 (1931).
6judicial Techniques in CombatingTax Avoidance, 51 MIcH. L. REv. 1021 (1953).
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part of tax counsel is probably super-conservative. We have seen so
many good tax schemes go wrong in the past several years that we are
afraid to advise our clients to make reasonably necessary business
transactions. The more we practice, the more we learn, the more cautious we are likely to become. What is worse, some of us air our
fears in public; and, as the Roehners have pointed out, these ultrapessimistic comments encourage the Commissioner to greater efforts;
he keeps trying cases which he should never have had a chance to
7
win.
While there have been a number of piecemeal attacks on this
problem, there have been few attempts at an analysis sufficiently
broad in scope to aid either counsel or, perhaps, the courts.8 What
is needed is a rationale of the entire background of tax law, or at least
an assembling of the rules of probable judicial reaction to taxpayer
action. A critical analysis of .the way courts do approach tax cases
may point the way courts should go, whether they go that way or
not. The objective should be to eliminate the tax practitioner's
present role as handicapper in a tax race between the taxpayer and
the government. That the best we can do today is merely to quote the
odds on a tax gamble is unfortunate. Taxpayers deserve better
treatment from their counsel -and from their government as well.0
The effort here is merely to suggest a method of analysis which
might, in part at least, permit a solution. The very antiquity of the
problem makes a solution more difficult. That it has, like Topsy,
"just growed" for so long may have produced a completely unmanageable result; 10 but it appears to be worth a try.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Rules of Construction
First, problems or rules of solution that relate purely to statutory
construction should be isolated. Particularly in the income tax field
7Ratio Decidendi in Federal Tax Cases, 9 TAx L. Rxv. 75 (1953), cites chapter

and verse of erroneously conservative opinions of tax counsel.
sRice, supra note 6, is an outstanding example.
9The Commissioner, in advising taxpayers through the medium of the regulations, is often content to parrot the statute (e.g., U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.115 (1)-l,
stock dividends), thus inviting litigation which is concerned largely with nice
distinctions and fanciful profundities, e.g., Schmitt v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 819
(3d Cir. 1954), reversing 20 T.C. 352 (1953), superseding §19.114 P-H TO 1952.
LoTaxes have always been with us, and even income taxes have been around
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this is an accentuated problem in tax statutes. We sometimes refer
to their growing complexity, but that is no new problem. Albert
Walker, an attorney schooled in the complexities of patent law, made
the following comment on the 1913 ancestor of our present code:11
"The income tax statute, as it was signed by President Wilson, on October 3, 1913, has the following character, as a specimen of statute writing.
"Many of its sequences of words which are nominally sentences, are so complicated and incoherent that they cannot
be parsed, or otherwise analyzed by means of any set of
rules of English grammar. And what is worse, the elements
of the statute are so unsystematically connected and disconnected, that no accurate and complete knowledge of its
purport, can be achieved by any man without many days of
hard study. Though many millions of copies of its full text have
been printed and published and examined, during the four
months of its statutory existence, it is not probable that twenty
men in the world, understand it even now."
That this situation has not improved significantly should not
require citation, and the following supporting quotation is added
merely because it happens to have been penned by a supporter of the
"square comers" doctrine:12
"In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax,
for example, merely dance before my eyes in a meaningless
procession: cross-reference to cross-reference, exception upon
exception - couched in abstract terms that offer no handle to
seize hold of - leave in my mind only a confused sense of some
vitally important, but successfully concealed, purport, which
it is my duty to extract, but which is within my power, if at
all, only after the most inordinate expenditure of time. I know
that these monsters are the result of fabulous industry and ingenuity, plugging up this hole and casting out that net, against
for a long time. The English income tax is usually dated from an enactment proposed by Pitt in 1799, 39 GEo. III, c. 13; but a tax was assessed on all offices and
pensions by George I and George II, BL. COMM. *326, note k.
l1THE UNCONSTrIUTIONAL

CHARACTER AND THE ILLEGAL ADMINISTRATION

OF THE

INCOME TAX LAW 16 (1914).

2Learned Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947).
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all possible evasion; yet at times I cannot help recalling a
saying of William James about certain passages of Hegel: that
they were no doubt written with a passion of rationality; but
that one cannot help wondering whether to the reader they
have any significance save that the words are strung together
with syntactical correctness."
Adding together, we get this principle: Men must turn square
corners on the taxation road, even though the route is poorly charted
and the road signs and signals are inadequate, or even misleading.
The principles and rules of the interpretation of statutes are a
part of the common law. 13 Taxing statutes are subject to the same
rules of construction as ordinary statutes, such as those of pari materia
and associated words and phrases. And they are subject to the general
principles of statutory construction, perhaps even to some extent to
the great pronouncement on the subject by Lord Coke in Heydon's
Case.14 There are, nevertheless, some rules of statutory construction
peculiarly applicable to tax cases, one of which has produced wheels
within wheels3 5
Historically the primary rule of tax statute construction was that
a -statute imposing taxes must be construed strictly against the government and in favor of the taxpayer. 6 That is still a rule that is
"Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888): "There is, however, one clear
exception to the statement that there is no national common law. The interpretation of the Constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the
fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law,
and are to be read in the light of its history. The code of constitutional and
statutory construction which, therefore, is gradually formed by the judgments of
this court, in the application of the Constitution and the laws and treaties made
in pursuance thereof, has for its basis so much of the common law as may be
implied in the subject, and constitutes a common law resting on national authority."
See 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 11, n.5 (3d ed. 1943): "It is doubtful

that the federal common law rules of statutory interpretation are affected by
the Erie case."
143 Coke 72, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (K.B. 1584).
15The general rule for construing revenue legislation strictly against the
government has become firmly established, 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
293 (3d ed. 1943).
l6This was considered the principal rule applicable to the construction of
federal tax statutes in the early days of the income tax, BLACK, INCOME TAXATION
66 (1913). And it has received lip service in a number of cases since, e.g., McFeely
v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 102 (1935); Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917). Even
in White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281 (1938), the Supreme Court apparently re-
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applicable in state and local taxation and in some minor phases of
federal taxation. But the Congress very cleverly drew the income,
estate, and gift tax statutes to take advantage of another-and an
offsetting- rule. It purported to tax gross income, the gross estate,
and all gifts and transfers for an inadequate consideration; and then
permitted certain deductions, exemptions, and exclusions. To take
advantage of these deductions, exemptions, and exclusions, however,
the taxpayer must fall squarely within them. They are to be construed
strictly against the taxpayer and for the government. 17
Thus the Congress completely legislated the historical attitude
toward taxing statutes out of existence; and it took the courts until
1951 to temper the wind -ever so slightly, and in language only to the shorn lamb. In Lykes v. United States,18 decided against the
taxpayer, the Court recognized that "Ed]eductions from an individual's
taxable income are limited to those allowed by §23. Their extent depends upon the legislative policy expressed in the fair and natural
meaning of that section."'10 This departure from the rule of strict
interpretation had been advocated by Mr. Justice Black in his dissenting opinion in McDonald v. Commissioner20
"Taxation on net, not on gross, income has always been the
broad basic policy of our income tax laws. Net income may be
defined as what remains out of gross income after subtracting
the ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in efforts to
obtain or to keep it."
The weight of Dean Griswold's argument was also behind it.21
nounced the doctrine only because it considered more appropriate the application
of the countervailing tests of legislative history and the strict construction of
deduction statutes.
171nterstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590 (1943); Helvering v.

Northwest Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., 311 U.S. 46 (1940); White v. United States,
305 U.S. 281 (1938).
18343 U.S. 118 (1952).
'Old. at 120. The footnote to this statement is as follows: "There have been
expressions by this Court placing a restrictive interpretation upon allowable deductions by virtue of 'the now familiar rule that an income tax deduction is a
matter of legislative grace and that the burden of clearly showing the right to the
claimed deduction is on the taxpayer.' ... Such an interpretation is not necessary

here and is not relied upon in this case."
20323 U.S. 57, 66 (1944).
'lNote, An Argument against the Doctrine that Deductions Should Be Nar-
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The rule of fair and natural construction makes considerable sense;
and it should be adopted more forthrightly by the courts, thus eliminating from the field of taxation a double-barreled canon of construction that is likely to fire indiscriminately from both ends.
Purpose Test
If the courts should move out of the tests of strict or liberal
construction they would probably give greater weight to the test
of "statutory purpose":

22

".. . a reasonable construction of all tax measures should be

preferred. Emphasis belongs upon the general objectives
of such laws with the view to accomplishing uniformity and
equality among the class of persons sought to be taxed."
This problem of statutory purpose becomes acute when it results
in a superiority of context over text. Pertinent examples are found
in the language of such cases as Bazley v. Commissioner: "[Rlecapitalization as used in §112 (g) must draw its meaning from its function
in that section. .

.

. Therefore, 'recapitalization' must be construed

23
with reference to the presuppositions and purpose of §112(g)."
Another example is found in the social security tax cases. In Bartels
v. Birmingham,2 4 following United States v. Silk,25 the Court found
an expanded definition of "employee" pertinent to the purpose of
26
the legislation, although the case was not ruled by that consideration.
As we proliferate on the understanding of courts of the "statutory

purpose" test 27 we draw closer to the common law of taxation, using

that term in a more refined sense. For we must answer the question:
What is the purpose of federal taxation?

rawly Construed as a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 HARV. L. REv. 1142 (1943).
223 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 297 (3d ed. 1943).
U.S. 737, 740 (1947).
24See 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947).
23331

25See 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947).
261t presented a problem sufficient

to require prompt congressional action,
Congress said "employee" that was what
that
when
effect
the
general
however, to
it meant, P.L. 642, 80th Cong., passed over veto June 14, 1948.
270ne final comment on extreme uses of this test: It implies, of course, that
the Congress cannot, or does not, say what it really means.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol7/iss2/3
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BASIC JUDICIAL PRECEPTS

We now come to the point where definition is most difficultand most important. Many of the guideposts point in diametrically
opposite directions. The same rule that closes a loophole for one
taxpayer may, if consistently applied, open a bigger one for another.28
The problem is not so much one of uncharted routes as of an excess
of charts- each different.
There are a few primary propositions. The most important one
is very simple and very central: The primary object of any tax statute
is to produce revenue. This is no new or startling concept. 29 That
this rule does not frequently appear in judicial decisions makes it no
less important for their comprehension. It does appear with sufficient frequency to warrant the assumption of its effective application
as a background factor in tax law generally; 30 and its force is certainly
recognized by taxpayers' counsel. 31
28
in a comment on Commissioner v. Landers Corp., 210 F.2d 188 (6th Cir. 1954),
Rabkin & Johnson, FED. TAX. REP., Summ. No. 140 (Mar. 1954), conclude: "This
decision discloses the trap which exists for all corporations which have acquired
their stock without going through a formal reduction of capital. On the other
hand, it would seem to open a loophole for any corporation which happens to
possess such stock, and which would otherwise issue new stock at less than the
treasury stock's cost to it. It may sell the treasury stock and incur a capital loss."
29The Federal Corporation Tax Law of 1909, c. 6, §38, 36 STAT. 11 (1909), was
the first of the modern effective federal income tax statutes. MACHEN, A TREATISE ON
THE FEDERAL CORPORATION TAX LAW OF 1909 (1910), begins his discussion (at
p. 4): "It is perhaps not superfluous to say that the primary object of the law as
a revenue law, is to produce revenue."
30Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 89 (1934): "The general
object of this act is to put money into the federal treasury; and there is manifest
in the reach of its many provisions an intention on the part of Congress to bring
about a generous attainment of that object by imposing a tax upon pretty much
every sort of income subject to the federal power." Commissioner v. Phipps, 336
U.S. 410, 417 (1949): "We conclude from the cases that the Sansome rule is
grounded not on a theory of continuity of the corporate enterprise but on the
necessity to prevent escape of earnings and profits from taxation."
31"As every tax lawyer knows, in a Federal income tax litigation, the taxpayer
has two strikes against him. The courts consistently lean in favor of the government. They feel a duty to 'protect the revenue'...." Moser, Effect of Variations
Between Claim for Refund and Trial in Suits for Refund, 12 PRocrEINGs OF
N.Y.U. ANN. INsr. ON FE.. TAxATION 949 (1954). It is preferable to place this
attitude on the basis of a common law rule rather than on an unconscious judicial
bias. It is sometimes facetiously stated that the judicial current of tax law took
a marked change of course on June 6, 1932, when the Congress made salaries of
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From that first concept there comes the natural corollary: If tax32
payer conduct is intended "solely to reduce tax liability," it will fall
as a tax-defeating transaction.
If taxes are the object and business of government in revenue
legislation, then they are not the business of the taxpayer. 33 He must
stick to his business of butchering, baking, or candlestick makingand let the taxes fall where they may. 34 This attitude is the source
of all of the reality tests:
35
(1) Is the transaction binding on the parties?
(2) Does the transaction have a business purpose? 0
(8) Are the separate steps in the transaction, although authorized by the statute, merely one unauthorized single transaction?37
3
(4) Is the transaction merely a sham or camouflage?
(5) Who earns the income? Who owns the property? Who
is the taxpayer?3 9

the federal judiciary subject to income tax, Revenue Act of 1932, §22 (a), 47
178 (1932).
3
2Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 476 (1940).

STAT.

33"The avoidance or suspension of taxes is not a business," Electrical Securities
Corp. v. Commissioner, 92 F.2d 593, 595 (2d Cir. 1937).
34That courts have usually refrained from voicing these propositions in outspoken terms makes them no less important in the analysis of tax decisions. Spear,
"Corporate Business Purpose" in Reorganizations, 3 TAx L. Rav. 225, 244 (1947),
in discussing the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Bazley v. Commissioner,
complains: "It is submitted that if the Court feels that the tax-deferring provisions
of section 112 should not be granted where tax avoidance is the principal consideration, it should recognize that such is the rule it is establishing, and not indirectly establish the rule through vague and indefinite language."
35This is a minimum requirement, of course; and it might be extended to
situations in which transactions, although perhaps legally binding, are actually
ineffectual because of family or other extra-legal sanctions. Compare Flato v.
Commissioner, 195 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1952), with Culbertson v. Commissioner, 194
F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1952). As to transactions shown to be legally binding by court
decree, compare Saulsbury v. United States, 199 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 906 (1953), with Channing v. Hassett, 200 F.2d 514 (1st Cir. 1952).
sSBazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947); Commissioner v. Estate of
Bedford, 325 U.S. 283 (1945); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1934).
s7Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945); Minnesota Tea Co.
v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609 (1938).
3sCommissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949); Bazley v. Commissioner,
supra note 36; Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., supra note 37; Griffiths v.
Commissioner, 308 U.S. 355 (1939).
•39Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941); Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S.
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This attitude may also explain why these tests have not received a
uniform and consistent application throughout the length and
breadth of the Internal Revenue Code. For example, exchanges under
Section 112 (b) (5) of the Code (transfers of property into a corporation in exchange for stock or securities) require no "business purpose"
for their validity as tax-free exchanges;4 0 but those under the reorganization provisions of the same section 41 must meet that test. The explanation is probably in two phases: (1) The courts in the former
case had no handy vehicle of construction, such as finding the appropriate legislative intention resulting from the use of quasitechnical words like "reorganization" and "recapitalization"; and (2)
the use of Section 112 (b) (5) transfers as tax avoidance devices is
seriously hampered by the various corporate income and penalty
taxes, such as the personal holding company and Section 102 taxes.
Furthermore, as soon as there was a serious problem of tax avoidance
in which Section 112 (b) (5) might have played a small part, congressional corrective action preceded litigation.42
There is another phenomenon in the use of these tests which can
be explained only with reference to the basic proposition that protection of the revenues is a primary judicial consideration: These
tests will be used in aid of the government but not in aid of the
taxpayer.4 3 That this may produce in a particular case an inequitable
122 (1940); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Helvering v. Clifford, 309
U.S. 331 (1940); Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 (1933); Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S.
376 (1930); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
4-Wg& K Holding Corp., 38 B.T.A. 830 (1938); Handbird Holding Corp., 32
B.T.A. 238 (1935).
42INT. REv. CoDE §§112(b) (3), (4); 112 (g) (1).
42
1NT. REv. CODE §117(m), added to by §212(a) of the Revenue Act of 1950,
64 STAT. 934 (1950) (collapsible corporations); H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong.
2d Sess. 99 (1950); SEN. RE,. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1950), reprinted
in 1950-2 CuMx. BuLL. 451, 548.

43
"In effect the courts have made subsection 112(g) a two-way street for the
Commissioner, but have often, in corresponding situations, restricted the taxpayer
to going just one way, upholding 'reorganizations' only where a greater tax
revenue results," Spear, supra note 34, at 246.
"Unfortunately the doctrine that the substance of a transaction will be controlling for tax purposes is one that is not available to taxpayers to invoke for
their own benefit. During all of this time that the courts have gone to great
lengths to disregard form when used by taxpayers to cloak a tax saving device,
there has continued an equally strong doctrine that since a taxpayer has a choice
of forms to follow he will not be permitted to disregard the form he has chosen
when it proves disadvantageous to him." MILE, TAX PLANNING 7 (1945) (pub-
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or hardship result is of no concern to the sovereign, interested only
in maintaining the revenues.
This "strict law" application of taxing statutes has not prevailed
without criticism from within the judiciary itself. When a Tax
Court majority has found a "real hardship under the facts of the
instant case" but considered that it had "no power to change the
law as written," the minority has pleaded eloquently for the application of "equitable principles," particularly if the case involved
no tax evasion purpose and a penalty tax was imposed. "To impose
a penalizing tax under the circumstances is to penalize good faith.
Congress did not intend.., to bring about such a result....-44
If there are to be any "equitable principles" of tax law, we should
assume that a beginning proposition would be: Any test, rule, or
doctrine judicially developed solely to avoid tax evasion should be
applied only when the intention to evade taxes is demonstrably present.
Such tests or rules should not receive an automatic application to
similar transactions of other taxpayers.
The present predilection of the Supreme Court to limit its decisions to a case-by-case approach 45 has not worked too well in tax
cases. Decisions based on extra-statutory judicial perception cannot
be made without some reference to governing rules; and the Commissioner obviously feels compelled to apply these rules without much
attention to possible factual distinctions or to the principles behind
the rules. Out of Commissioner v. Tower"' came the battle slogan
that the wife cannot be a business partner of the husband when she
"does not share in the management and control of the business,
contributes no vital additional service, and where the husband
purports in some way to have given her a partnership interest" that is, when she invests no capital originating with her.
In Commissioner v. Culbertson47 the Supreme Court chided the
Tax Court for its application of the simple objective standards of
lished by Practising Law Institute).
44Safety Tube Corp. v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 757, 769 (1947).
45"Congress has not attempted a definition of what is recapitalization and we
shall follow its example. The search for relevant meaning is often satisfied not by
a futile attempt to abstract definition but by pricking a line through concrete
applications." Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737, 741 (1947). "The governing
legal rule can hardly be stated more narrowly. To attempt-to do so would only
challenge astuteness in evading it." Id. at 742.
46327 U.S. 280, 290 (1946).
47337 U.S. 733 (1949).
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the slogan, without regard to the ultimate subjective standards of the
underlying principle: whether "the parties in good faith and acting
with a business purpose intended to join together in the present conduct of the enterprise." 48 This comes close to the adoption by the
Supreme Court of the principle that we are asserting should be
applied. It falls short by the substitution of other tests or slogans,
such as "good faith" and "business purpose," for the more central
theme of the taxpayers' predominant intention to avoid taxes.
A second equitable principle which naturally evolves from the
first one would require that all equitable principles be equitably applied. Thus, any test, rule, or doctrine judicially developed solely to
avoid tax evasion must also be applied in the taxpayer's behalf to
9
avoid unjust tax exactions.4
In dealing with the potent economic factors inherent in tax
cases under the present high rates, judicial prescience and foresight
of a high order are required. Will rules devised to protect the
revenues in good times continue to protect them in periods of recession?5 0 Will "strict law" rules produce such uncertain results that
the tax-law gambler has a real advantage over his more conservative
and businesslike competitor? Such inequality in the tax burden is
most likely to grow in a soil well fertilized with judicial abstractions
of uncertain application but phrased in vague denunciation of taxsavings schemes.
It is time that tax law grew up. The strict-law application so
appropriate in the rise to high taxes, and the consequent ingenious
development of tax avoidance schemes, should now give way to a
more settled and mature approach. Equitable principles, so long as
they do not do violence to the words of the taxing statute, are more
likely to produce an equality of the tax burden among taxpayers
similarly situated. That, it would seem, should be a paramount in481d. at 742. A similar situation existed between Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945), and United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338
U.S. 451 (1950).
40"The appetite for taxes is not so voracious, the commands of the statute
are not so inexorable, as to require the doing of an injustice when there is open
another course that is more fully consonant with law and reason and which
course, if followed, will lead neither to evasion by the taxpayer nor extortion by
the Government." Hilpert v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 929, 933 (5th Cir. 1945).
50E.g., rules which circumscribe and limit the capital gains provisions in times
of prosperity will naturally permit more ordinary losses in times of depression or
recession.
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tention which could be attributed to Congress, and one which it
would be unlikely to disavow.
DEVELOPMENT OF UNIQUE PROPERTY CONCEPTS 51

In an effort to provide a uniform application of taxing statutes
throughout the forty-eight states, the federal courts have in some instances devised their own common law of property, contracts, sales,
and other tax-affecting transactions. 52 A few illustrations will suffice
to present the problem, without producing any real answer to the
paramount question: When local laws differ, which is the preferable
choice for tax-law purposes?
We assume, of course, that the federal interpretation is not to
be developed in vacuo; that it necessarily is to have some relationship
to what the law has been in some place at some time. A "sale" must
bear some reasonable relationship, even in tax law, to events which
we have historically considered as sales. The answer is in part found
in a statement by Mr. Justice Clark in South Buffalo Railway Co. v.
Ahern, 58 which is not a tax case: The "peculiarities of local law ...
may not gnaw at rights rooted in federal legislation."5 4
5'Because of its broad scope, this very important phase of the federal common
law of taxation will here necessarily receive much less consideration than it
deserves.
52State rules govern when it is the clear intent of Congress that the tax
effect of the transaction should depend on local law, Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S.
103, 110 (1932). The intermediate proposition reads: "State law creates legal
interests and rights. The federal revenue acts designate what interests or rights,
so created, shall be taxed," Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940). But
this gives way to the doctrine that "the revenue laws are to be construed in the
light of their general purpose to establish a nationwide scheme of taxation uniform
in its application," United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399, 402 (1941). See also
Lyeth v. Hoey, 805 U.S. 188 (1938). The particular phase of this problem in
which we are interested is the source of federal law, absent an obligation to
use local law.
53344 U.S. 367, 372 (1953).
54Any successful effort to establish peculiarities of local law in the federal tax
structure naturally finds immediate imitation. Subsequent to the favored position
in which the community property states found themselves, there was a flood of
state legislation to equalize the position of the other states. Michigan, Nebraska,
Oregon passed effective community property acts; Pennsylvania's was invalidated
by its own courts; many other state legislatures were importuned to follow suit.
But when there was a "peculiarity" feature in the community property program
adopted by a state the Supreme Court invalidated it for tax purposes. Com-
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In Burnet v. Harmel5 the Supreme Court had under consideration
the effect of Texas law, which "unlike that of other states" regarded
an oil and gas lease as a present sale of the oil and gas in place. The
question was: Did such a lease qualify as a sale under the capital
gains provisions of the act? And the Court held - "no sale." The
language of the decision is informative: ". . . these leases would not
generally be described as a 'sale,' using the term either in its technical
sense or as it is commonly understood." 56 The Court should not
adopt a "distorted, rather than the common meaning of the term
'sale.' "57
This does not imply, of course, that the rule of law that will be
applied to define common law terms will be the rule followed by
the majority of the states. Presumably there will be arguments concerning which rule is supported by the best logic, and which is most
consistent with the purpose of the act.
Any cursory examination of the choice of law in such cases leaves
the definite impression that the effect on the revenues is an important
consideration; and we are back following the thread which seems
central to the consideration of the entire field of federal taxation:
The primary purpose of the Code is revenue, and that purpose must
not be affected by the vagaries of local law.-8
Corporations are the creatures of local law, recognized as being
taxable entities by the taxing statute. Will the corporate entity persist inviolate, or will local law decisions prescribing the conditions for
"piercing the corporate veil" be followed? Neither will prevail. The
answer found in Higgins v. Smith59 is that the fiction of the corporate
entity is merely a handy tool for tax exaction, or for the avoidance
of tax evasion, depending on where you stand: "The Government
may look at actualities and upon determination that the form employed for doing business or carrying out the challenged tax event
missioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44 (1944), e.g., invalidated, for tax purposes, the
Oklahoma "elective" community property act. Oklahoma immediately countered
with an orthodox community property system. The Congress, of course, finally

moved to end this local-law discrimination by providing the split-income and
marital deduction provisions of the Revenue Act of 1948, 61 STAT. 210 (1948).
-287 U.S. 103 (1932).

61d. at 107.
57id. at 108.

5sTo the extent that the tax laws provide their own definitions, as in INT. REv.
CODE §3797, we are not dependent on local law. But even those definitions use

words and phrases which have gained their legal significance outside the tax law field.
s9308 U.S. 473, 477 (1940).
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is unreal or a sham may sustain or disregard the effect of the fiction
as best serves the purposes of the tax statute."
It does not seem to be unfair to examine decisions of courts in
terms of actualities, just as the courts examine actions taken by taxpayers. These actualities naturally include the pressure for revenues
in national emergencies,60 the natural inclination of taxpayers and
their counsel to search out tax-saving devices in times of high tax
rates, and perhaps even the suggestion that "many federal judges are
former government attorneys and have an unconscious loyalty to
their former client." 6' 1
Whatever the reasons, it seems apparent that the urge for "protection of the revenues" has had a significant effect on the development
of tax law. It has resulted in a "strict law" concept, which ought not
to extend beyond the development of a complete and consistent
federal tax structure. The principles of equity and fairness which
changed the face of strict common law should now be applied impartially to make less frightening the countenance of the tax collecting agencies and of the courts to which they apply for sanctions of
their acts.

6OThat pressure for revenues is reflected in Treasury Department action has
been often charged and as often denied. "The regulations are, for instance, in
practice written with the welcome assistance of those representing all income
groups. Hidebound concepts of getting in dollars under vague expressions of
'protecting the revenue' are not the order." Oliphant, Administration of Federal
Internal Revenue Laws, in PRACTICAL AsPEcrs OF FEDERAL TAXATION, pt. 2, p. 4
(B.N.A. 1946). There may be sufficient evidence of an opposite conclusion to
justify limiting the legal effect of regulations. E.g., see Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 42 (1939): "We granted certiorari in this case . . . and
in the Humphreys case . . . upon the representation of the Government that it
has taken inconsistent positions with respect to the question involved in the two
cases ....
"It has continued to take these inconsistent positions here, stating that it is
unable to determine which construction of the statute will be most advantageous
to the Government in point of revenue collected."
6Moser, Effect of Variations Between Claim for Refund and Trial in Suits
PROcMDINGS OF N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAXATION 949 (1954).
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